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Abstract 
―Unity in Diversity‖ was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Constitutional 
Treaty. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. It deserves to be kept alive in a 
new constitutional perspective, namely the re-conceptualisation of European law as new 
type of conflicts law. The new type of conflicts law which the paper advocates is not 
concerned with selecting the proper legal system in cases with connections to various 
jurisdictions. It is instead meant to respond to the increasing interdependence of formerly 
more autonomous legal orders and to the democracy failure of constitutional states which 
result from the external effects of their laws and legal decisions on non-nationals. European 
has many means to compensate these shortcomings. It can derive its legitimacy from that 
compensatory potential without developing federal aspirations.  
The paper illustrates this approach with the help of two topical examples. The first is the 
conflict between European economic freedoms and national industrial relations (collective 
labour) law. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert in which the 
Court established the supremacy of the freedoms over national labour law is criticised as a 
counter-productive deepening of Europe‘s constitutional asymmetry and its social deficit. The 
second example from environmental law concerns the conflict between Austria and the 
Czech Republic over the Temelin nuclear power pant. The paper criticises the reasoning of 
the ECJ, but does not suggest an alternative outcome to the one the Court has reached. 
The introductory and the concluding sections generalise the perspectives of the conflicts-law 
approach. The introductory section takes issue with max Weber‘s national state. The 
concluding section suggests a three-dimensional differentiation of the approach which seeks 
to respond to the need for transnational regulation and governance. 
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Preliminary Remarks 
―Unity in Diversity‖ was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Constitutional 
Treaty.1 This motto deserves to be kept alive, despite, or even because of, this failure and 
the retreat of European politics from overt constitutional ambitions. It is even safe to say that, 
precisely through these failures, the need to come to grips with the challenges that it 
articulates have become more obvious. The core problem from which this essay departs can 
be simply stated: the Member States of the European Union are no longer autonomous. 
They are, in many ways, inter-dependent and hence depend upon co-operation. However, 
Europe has not transformed into a federation and it cannot become a federation as long as 
its constituent actors do not agree to the federal vision. Should we, nevertheless, keep the 
federal perspective alive? The reaction to this question cannot be uniform. In view of the 
histories of European democracies, their uneven potential and/or willingness to pursue 
objectives of distributional justice, to respond to economic and financial instabilities, and to 
cope with environmental challenges, differentiating answers suggest themselves. ―Social 
Europe‖ is probably the most delicate among these challenges, as long as it remains, at 
best, unclear whether and, if so, how, a European federation might respect and re-construct 
the embeddedness of Europe‘s welfare state traditions. This example is by no means 
exceptional. The sustainability of the whole European project seems to depend upon the 
construction and institutionalization of a ―third way‖ between or beyond the defense of the 
nation state, on the one hand, and federalist ambitions, on the other. This essay will explore 
the potential of the conflicts law approach to provide perspectives within which this challenge 
can be met. 
This is not only an immodest, if not overly ambitious suggestion, and also one which must 
not be misunderstood as a sceptic retreat from the European project. As a precautionary 
move, the first section will recall a classical address of Max Weber‘s. It will use this reference 
to re-construct the lasting merits and accomplishments of the integration project. It will also, 
in the same Section II, address the legitimacy problématique of this project‘s institutional 
design and discuss three significant theoretical efforts of the foundational period to cope with 
this challenge. The following Section III will analyse the responses of these three theories to 
the post-foundational dynamics of the integration project. Arguing that all three of these 
traditions realise an exhaustion of their potential to cope with Europe‘s present challenges, 
Section IV will present the conflicts law approach as an alternative response to Europe‘s 
legitimacy problématique. Two follow-up sections, one on the recent labour law 
jurisprudence of the ECJ (Section V), the other on its response to the conflict between the 
Czech Republic and Austria on atomic energy (Section VI), will illustrate the operation of the 
conflicts law approach. The concluding Section VII will summarise its problems and 
perspectives. 
                                                     
1
 Article I-8 Draft European Constitutional Treaty (OJABl. C 310/1, 16/12/2004). 
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I.  Max Weber’s Nation State 
Back in 1895, Max Weber gave his inaugural address in the University of Freiburg, then 
situated in Bismarck‘s Kaiserreich of 1871. The address was published in an enlarged 
version under the title ―The National State and Economic Policy‖.
2
 It became a real classic 
and has now regained a fascinating topicality for two reasons. The first concerns the object 
of the field study which Weber used to explain some of his more abstract theoretical 
positions and provocative political views. The field study dealt with the reasons for, and 
implications of, the migration of workers. The analysis which Weber delivered excels through 
a precision and subtlety which is difficult to find in the current debates, at least in legal 
quarters. However, Weber also used this case to explain and defend a vision of the political 
and economic commitments of the nation state, which is, at best, a contrast to the European 
vocation – but is, nevertheless, at least negatively instructive because it helps us to realise to 
what degree this vision is still alive in contemporary debates and legal arguments.
3
 
Weber drew upon the empirical work which he had undertaken in 1892, while still a 
Pivatdozent in Berlin, in the context of a major Enquète of the Verein für Sozialpolitik 
(Association for Social Reform) on the situation of the agrarian work force in the German 
Reich. He had focused there on ―the posting of workers‖ from Poland to the Prussian 
Province of West-Prussia. His multi-faceted analysis addressed the transformation of pre-
modern patriarchal structures into a capitalist agrarian economy, identified the pressures 
which this processes exerted on the landowners, described the incentive structure which 
fostered the import of ―cheap labour‖ from the neighbouring regions of Poland and from the 
deeper East Galicia.
4
 The capability of the Poles to endure the poor working conditions and 
the social situation in the new agrarian economy, so Weber observed, was fostering the 
gradual increase of the Polish and the decrease of the German share. The great theorist of 
occidental rationalism felt deeply irritated. Weber expressed his concern about the decline of 
―Germanness‖ (Deutschtum) in West Prussia. And, equally irritating in EU-perspectives, he 
called for corrective state measures: a closure of the borders to migrating workers, and the 
purchase of land by the state. 
Even more irritating, however, is what he submits as his ―subjective‖ position – the value 
judgements nurturing his political advice. 
And the nation State is for us not an indefinite something that one feels one can place all the 
higher the more its essence is shrouded in mystical gloom, but the worldly power 
organisation of the nation, and in this nation State is raison d’état for us, the ultimate value 
                                                     
2
 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, (Freiburg i.Br.: C.A. Wagner, 1895) [citations here are from Ben 
Fowkes‘ translation in (1980) 9 Economy and Society, pp. 420-449]. 
3
 See the example of the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof discussed in Section VI.2.1 infra. 
4
 See the reconstruction of Weber‘s analysis of the underlying transformation processes by Ola Ageval, ―Science, 
Values, and the Empirical Argument in Max Weber‘s Inaugural Address‖, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, pp. 157-177. 
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criterion on economic considerations too. It does not mean to us, as a strange 
misunderstanding believes: ‗state assistance‘ instead of ‗self-help‘, national regulation of 
economic life instead of the free play of economic forces, but we want through this slogan to 
raise the demand that for questions of German national economic policy – including the 
question whether and how far the State should interfere in economic life or whether and 
when it ought instead to set the nation‘s economic forces free to develop themselves and 
tear down restraints on them – in the individual case the last and decisive vote ought to go to 
the economic and political power interests of our nation, and its bearer, the German State.
5
 
Strong words, indeed. Even Weber‘s audience in Freiburg was apparently upset and Weber 
distanced himself later from this strong language.
6
 What motivated his polemic? Rita 
Aldenhoff, in her very instructive comments on the address, starts her analysis with a 
quotation from Weber‘s contribution to the Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen 
Kongresses held in Frankfurt in 1894. There, Weber had stated his normative premises quite 
succinctly: 
We do want … to shape the conditions of life in a way that makes people feel good, but such 
that, under the pressures of the unavoidable struggle for life, the best in the, the physical and 
psychological qualities that we want to save for our nation, will be preserved. Well … these 
are value-judgments and they are changeable. Anyway, there is an irrational element. 
Is this a pure nationalist talking? ―Germanness‖, as defined, can neither be understood as 
some form of brutal nationalism; nor does it have anything in common with the homo 
economicus, as we know him from mainstream economic theorising. Weber‘s homini are real 
human beings; he exposes them to demands of a different quality. What is, at any rate, 
noteworthy is the care which Weber takes to differentiate between theoretical, economic, 
and the political orientations which should in his view inform the Volkswirtschaftspolitik 
(economic policy-making). When he diagnoses the readiness of migrant workers from 
Poland to accept the hardships of their new existence in the ―host state‖, he is, in fact, 
describing what we would call a ―race to the bottom‖ and questioning precisely the 
―willingness to starve the most‖ as the underlying mechanism.
7
 There is a very critical 
dimension in Weber‘s position, in that he rejects any claim to ―objective validity‖ of 
arguments presented in the name of economics; such arguments tend to camouflage 
normative judgements and political choices – a cardinal sin in the eyes of Weber‘s 
epistemology. This is not to defend the substance of Weber‘s pronouncements. We have 
reasons to remain irritated when reading about the ―role played by physical and 
                                                     
5
 The translation is not taken from the source in note 2 but was done by Iain F. Fraser, Florence. 
6
 See Max Weber‘s letter to his brother Alfred, cited in Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger, ―Max Weber‘s Inaugural Address of 
1895 in the Context of the Contemporary Debates in Political Economy‖, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, pp. 143-156, 
at 146 note 8. 
7
 See Ola Agevall, ibid. (note 4), p. 174. 
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psychological racial differences between nationalities [sic!] in their struggle for existence‖.
8
 
But Rita Aldenhoff‘s reference to Weber‘s trans-economic Menschenbild is a stringent 
defence of Weber the methodologist against Weber‘s political polemics. The methodologist 
remains of great topicality in his critique of spurious claims, not only of the historical school, 
but also of neo-classical economics
9
 – and their negligent contemporary use in misguiding 
rationalisations of the integration project as a whole and so many of its segments. 
                                                     
8
 This opening statement of the inaugural address is a core reference in the debates on Weber‘s nationalism; see, 
for example, Karl Palonen, ―Was Max Weber a ‗Nationalist‘? A Study in the Rhetoric of Conceptual Change, (2001) 1 
Max Weber Studies, pp. 196-214. Weber‘s nationalism and his political interventions have later nurtured the 
suspicion of a liaison dangereuse with Carl Schmitt (see Kjell Ebelbrekt, ―What Carl Schmitt picked up in Weber‘s 
Seminar: A Historical Controversy Revisited‖, (2009) 14 The European Legacy, pp. 667–684; the young Jürgen 
Habermas, who had helped to provoke this debate, has clarified his assessment suggesting that it seems more 
appropriate to call Carl Schmitt Max Weber‘s ―natural son‖ (see the reference in K. Engelbrekt at p. 668). 
9
 See O. Agevall, note 4, pp. 172-74. 
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II.  The European Response to The failures of Weber’s 
Nation States and the Problématique of its Institutional 
Design 
The project of European integration can be understood and re-constructed as a response to 
the failures of the Weberian nation state, and, more generally and in broader perspectives, to 
Europe‘s bitter experiences in the Twentieth century. After 50 years of integration, however, 
we are confronted with massive challenges: ever since the turn to majority-voting in the 
Single European Act of 1987, the compatibility of European rule with its democratic 
commitments is discussed with ever increasing intensity. In the aftermath of the French and 
the Dutch referenda of 2005, concerns over its neo-liberal tilt and the social deficit, i.e., the 
compatibility of its institutional design and the welfare traditions of European democracies 
moved to centre stage. The Irish ―No‖ of 2008 to the Treaty of Lisbon was perceived as an 
erosion of the permissive consensus that had backed the progress of integration. During the 
present financial crisis the instability of Europe‘s economic constitution became apparent. All 
of these unresolved issues and queries seem to suggest that we can no longer be so sure 
about the sustainability of the European project, but have to re-consider our premises. 
It would, of course, be absurd to assume that conceptual re-orientations, which an academic 
legal exercise such as the one we are undertaking, could produce ready-made answers to 
the type of problems just named, or lead to immediate practical changes. The ambitions 
which we pursue when suggesting a new way of thinking are much more modest. But, in 
their conceptualisation of the integration project, they propagate a change of paradigmatic 
proportions. European law tends to be portrayed as an ever growing and ever more 
comprehensive body of rules and principles of steadily richer normative qualities. This edifice 
is expected to come together through successive steps of legal integration. Such visions of 
the integration project and process rest, in part explicitly, in part implicitly, on daring 
assumptions about the social functions of law and its powers. Giandomenico Majone has 
recently characterised this conundrum as Europe‘s ―operational code‖: the ―priority of 
integration over all other competing values‖.
10
 One need, by no means, subscribe to his 
diagnosis in all of its aspects when realising that, law can, indeed, use this operational code 
on its ―integration through law― path only if, and as long as, it insulates itself from many 
specifics of national orders, from inherited varieties of conflict patterns and institutional 
mechanisms within economy and society – and even from the aspirations of its Member 
States and their governments. 
The messages which we are going to submit under the title of the ―conflicts law alternative‖ 
differ from the prevailing visions most markedly in two respects. As the recourse to the 
notion of conflicts law indicates, the approach assigns primacy to the resolution of conflicts 
                                                     
10
 Thus, G. Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power. The EU at Fifty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 1. 
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arising out of Europe‘s diversity rather than the establishment of a unitary legal regime. 
Equally important, the approach takes account of the ongoing contestation about the kind of 
polity which the integration process is to generate. This contestation is not different in 
principle from the ongoing domestic contests about the proper political order – with the 
important difference, however, that the law of constitutional democracies provides a 
framework which channels political contestation, while, in contrast, the law of the integration 
process cannot build upon this type of legitimating framework. The modesty of the pragmatic 
ambitions which have underlined must not be understood as some complacent gesture. 
Quite to the contrary, we believe that the type of thinking and counter-visions which we seek 
to promote rests on quite solid grounds in the deeper structures of the European fabric. Its 
most widely-known reference point is the ―unity in diversity‖ motto of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty.
11
 Further precursors and allies can be named, such as Joseph Weiler‘s juxtaposition 
of ―Europe as unity‖ v. ―Europe as community‖,
12
 and Kalypso Nicolaïdes‘ vision of a 
European ―demoi-cracy‖.
13
 All that is original about the conflicts law approach is the plea for 
a resort to legal categories derived from conflict of laws traditions and conflict-of-laws 
methodologies in the legal re-construction of the ―unity in diversity‖ challenge. 
What kind of validity can our plea for re-orientation claim? The binary right/wrong, 
legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful codes in which the legal system operates, and to which lawyers 
appeal in their doctrinal argumentation, cannot be relied upon in our considerations without 
further ado. All of the important theories of legal integration have operated on horizons which 
that code cannot reach directly. They reflected the historical context of the integrations 
project, they sought to cope with the specifics and deficiencies of its institutional design – 
and, indeed, they continue with similarly comprehensive reflections when addressing 
Europe‘s present challenges. The conflicts law approach situates itself on an equivalent 
conceptual level. Just like its interlocutors in legal integration theory, it seeks to re-construct 
both the accomplishments of the integration project and its present impasses and crises, and 
to evaluate the pros and cons of the competing visions against such a background. It is of 
crucial importance to underline two limitations of this kind of exercise. It would, for one, be a 
misunderstanding to expect from the re-constructions of historical contexts and assumptions 
that they would reveal ―the true story‖ – a Leopold Rankan tale of ―wie es wirklich gewesen 
ist‖. What we seek to understand is the meta-positive assumptions on which legal 
conceptualisations of the integration project have relied, and from which they sought to 
derive normative guidance on their contributions to its operation. We will, then, necessarily, 
and deliberately so, have to proceed selectively, albeit not arbitrarily. Our re-construction will 
depart from, and be restricted to, three schools of thought of long-term significance. Each of 
the three approaches has some fundamentum in re. Each of them can claim to 
conceptualise important elements of Europe‘s integration law, and each of them can provide 
                                                     
11
 See note 1 supra. 
12
 See Sections II.3 and III.2.3 infra. 
13
 K. Nicolaïdis, ―The new constitution as European ‗demoi-cracy‘?‖ (2004) 7 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, pp. 76-93. 
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normative reasons for its specific conceptualisation: the model of European rule 
(Sozialmodell) which it defends and promotes. It is a further characteristic of our re-
construction that we take account of both the internal developments of each of these models 
and the continuous contestation among them, along with the ups and downs in terms of their 
practical impact. We will also argue, however, that all three have, notwithstanding their 
remarkable viability, deficits in common, which exhaust their potential to cope with the 
present challenges that Europe faces. 
One aspect which the three models have in common can be stated negatively. They were 
perfectly aware of the discrepancy between the European and the national level of 
governance, and did not conceive of the European Economic Community as a constitutional 
democracy in being. What they have in common is a search for legitimate governance 
beyond nation-state confines and frames. Their messages on the modes of transnational 
governance, however, differ significantly: (1) ―Europe should be institutionalised as a 
technocratic regime and be restricted to that function‖. (2) ―Europe‘s vocation is the 
establishment of an ‗economic constitution‘ which is to protect individual freedoms and to 
discipline the exercise of political power‖; and (3) ―Europe has accomplished and should 
preserve an equilibrium between a supranational legal order and ongoing political 
bargaining‖. We will in this section focus on the foundational period and underline here a 
common deficit; the further development if the thre approaches and their potential to cope 
with the ―transformations of Europe‖ will be addressed in a separate section (III). 
II.1.  Europe as Technocratic Administration: Hans Peter Ipsen and 
Ernst Forsthoff 
Hans Peter Ipsen was the influential founding father of European Law in Germany. He was a 
very remarkable protagonist of Germany‘s legal scholarship. The Nazi period had left him, to 
paraphrase Hans Ulrich Jessurun d‘ Oliveira,
14
 ―not totally flawless‖ (nicht ganz fleckenlos). 
His post-war work on the Basic Law of the young German democracy, however, documents 
very clearly democratic commitments in general, and to the Sozialstaatlichkeit of the new 
order in particular.
15
 He had started to work on European law at the age of 50 – and helped 
to establish Europarecht as a new legal discipline.
16
 Precisely his democratic commitments 
                                                     
14
 H.U. Jessurun d‘Oliveira, ―An Anecdote, a Footnote‖, in: H.-P. Mansel et al. (eds), Festschrift fürErik Jayme, 
(Munich: Sellier. European Law Publishers, 2004), 387-402. Oliveira, writing in 1968, referred to Hans Dölle, from 
1954 onwards one of the Directors of the Max-Planck Institute für auländisches und internationals Privatrecht in 
Hamburg; on Ipsen, see Ch. Joerges, ―Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration 
Project‖, in: Ch. Joerges & N.S. Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National 
Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 167-191, at 182-84 
(note 92). 
15
 Suffice it here to point to H.P. Ipsen, ―Über das Grundgesetz‖ (1949), reprinted along with all of his later essays in 
idem, Über das Grundgesetz (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1988), pp 1-37. 
16
 See H. P. Ipsen, ―Der deutsche Jurist und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht―, in: Verhandlungen des 43. 
Deutschen Juristentages, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1964, vol. 2 L 14 et seq; idem, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972), p. 176 et seq; very remarkable, in the present context, is his rejection of the idea 
of an economic constitution at both European and national level in his Gemeinschaftsrecht, pp. 563-566. 
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may explain both: Ipsen‘s sensitivity for the precarious legitimacy of the European system on 
the one hand, and the affinities between his own response and the work of one of Germany‘s 
most famous contemporary constitutionalists, namely, Ernst Forsthoff, on the other. These 
affinities are, at first sight, somewhat surprising in view of the differences in their 
constitutional theorizing;
17
 they are, nevertheless, plausible in view of Ipsen‘s search for a 
type of rule whose validity was not dependent on democratic legitimacy. The communities 
were to confine themselves to administering questions of ―knowledge‖, but leave truly 
―political‖ questions to democratic bodies.
18
 The characterisation of the European 
Communities as ―Zweckverbände funktionaler Integration‖ (organisations with functionally-
defined objectives)‖ was path-breaking. With this theory, Ipsen rejected both further-reaching 
federal integration notions and earlier interpretations of the Community as a mere 
international organisation. He saw Community law as a tertium between (federal) state law 
and international law, constituted by its ―objective tasks‖ and adequately legitimised by their 
solution.
19
 This theory had an implicit answer to the queries about ―the social‖ on offer. Ernst 
Forsthoff had, in his contribution to the so-called Sozialstaatskontroverse, argued that the 
realisation of social objectives had to operate outside the rule of law; the provision of welfare 
was hence, by virtue of the very nature of social policies, characterised as an administrative 
task, which was incompatible with the commitment to the Rechtsstaat (―rule of law‖) in the 
Basic Law.
20
 This was not a principled objection against welfare policies. What is, 
nevertheless, difficult to conceive is how the European Zweckverband with its transnational 
machinery might actively pursue the type of activities which welfare states administer 
domestically. In more principled terms, it seemed, at any rate, inconceivable that the type of 
a ―hard‖ legal Sozialstaats-commitment, which Forsthoff‘s opponents understood as a 
constitutive dimension of the Federal Republic‘s democracy,
21
 would be institutionalised at 
European level. 
                                                     
17
 See H.P. Ipsen, Über das Grundgesetz, (note 15), reprinted also in E Forsthoff (ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und 
Sozialstaatlichkeit, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), pp. 16-41, on the one hand, and E. 
Forsthoff, ―Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaats‖, in (1954) 12 Veröffentlichungen der Vereininigung 
deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 8-36. 
18
 Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (note16 supra), p. 1045. 
19
 See H.P. Ipsen, Verfassungsperspektiven der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970). , 
p. 8 et seq., and the interpretation by M. Kaufmann, Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1997), p. 300 et seq., & 312 et seq; see, also, M. Bach, Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwaltungseliten, 
Experten und politische Legitimation in Europa, (Frankfurt aM: Campus, 1999), p. 38 et seq. 
20
 E. Forsthoff, ―Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates‖ (note17 supra). 
21
 The so-called Sozialstaats-debate is an evergreen in German constitutionalism; for recent contributions, see O. 
Eberl, ―Soziale Demokratie in Europa und zwischen Konstitutionalismus und Etatismus‖, in: A. Fischer-Lescano, F. 
Rödl & Ch. Schmid (eds), Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in 
Europa, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 245-256. A. Fischer-Lescano, ―Europäische Rechtspolitik und soziale 
Demokratie‖, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Internationale Politikanalyse, Abt. Internationaler Dialog) 2010, Bonn 2010; 
Ch. Joerges, ―Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration 
Process‖, (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology, pp. 65-85. 
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II.2.  Europe's Economic Ordo: Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm 
The notion of the ―social market economy‖ was formally introduced into Europe‘s 
constitutional parlance by a joint motion of Joschka Fischer and Domenique de Villepin in the 
course of the debates on the Constitutional Treaty.
22
 Their initiative was meant to calm down 
the anxieties over what was perceived as a neo-liberal tilt in the constitutional project. The 
clause on the social market economy has fulfilled this function quite well in the general 
public, and in the constitutional discourses of both lawyers
23
 and political scientists.
24
 The 
vague notion of the ―social‖ and simultaneously ―competitive‖ market economy of the 
Convention and the Treaty of Lisbon is situated at a great distance from the original and 
fairly precise contours of Germany‘s ―sozialer Marktwirtschaft‖.
25
 As the most important 
protagonist of the concept, Alfred Müller-Armack, explained repeatedly, the social market 
economy was to provide a ―third way‖ beyond economic liberalism, on the one hand, and 
beyond socialism, on the other. There was no conditioning of this model by requirements of 
―competitiveness‖; quite to the contrary, the governance of market mechanisms were 
subjected to commands of social justice.
 26
 
Müller-Armack and his political allies were keen to underline the compatibility of their vision 
with the Ordo-liberal School of economics and the essential role assigned to economic 
freedoms and the protection of an undistorted system of competition by law and strong 
politically-independent enforcement authorities. The development of Ordo-liberalism as an 
economic theory and vision of a political order had started in the early 1920s as a counter-
move against the strong cartelisation of the German economy and its corporatist links with a 
weak political system. The school survived National Socialism; it was perceived as a tradition 
not contaminated by National Socialism and therefore entitled to broad public recognition 
and influence. The details need not concern us here. What is important to note, however, is 
                                                     
22
 See the references in Ch. Joerges, ―What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy‖, 
(2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-489, at 486. 
23
 See, for example, F.C. Mayer, ―Die Rückkehr der Europäischen Verfassung? Ein Leitfaden zum Vertrag von 
Lissabon‖, (2008) Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 1141-1217, at 1165 et seq; idem, ―Der EuGH 
und das soziale Europa―, in Internationale Politikanalyse, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009), pp. 7-25 and the 
contributions to: U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen & L. Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law - From 
Rome to Lisbon, (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), and most prominently the German Constitutional Court‘s 
judgment of 30 June 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon. Bundesverfassungsgericht, file no.: 2 BvE 2 / 08, 2 BvE 5 / 08, 2 
BvR 1010 / 08, 2 BvR 1022 / 08, 2 BvR 1259 / 08 und 2 BvR 182 / 09, paras. 195 et seq.; the provisional English 
translation is available at:  
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.en.html. 
24
 See, for example, U. Liebert, ―Reconciling Social with Market Europe? The EU under the Lisbon Treaty‖, in, 
―European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon‖, D. Schiek, U. Liebert & H. Schneider 
(eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 2. 
25
 See, on the following, Ph. Manow, ―Modell Deutschland as an Interdenominational Compromise―, Minda De 
Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 003/2001; A. Ebner, ―The intellectual foundations of the 
social market economy. Theory, policy, and implications for European integration‖, (2006) 33 Journal of Economic 
Studies, pp. 206-223. 
26
 See, the references in Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, ―‗Social Market Economy‘ as Europe‘s Social Model?‖, in: Lars 
Magnusson & Bo Stråth (eds), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies in Historical Light. 
Preconditions for Future Policies from a Historical Perspective, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 125-158. 
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our concern for the social dimension of the European project, the initial compatibility of Ordo-
liberalism and the model of the social market, and the dissolution of this alliance which was 
replaced by a new alliance between the second generation of Ordo-liberalism and Anglo-
Saxon neo-liberalism. 
The leading protagonists of the Freiburg School, the intellectual Heimat of Germany‘s post-
war Ordo-liberalism in both economic and legal scholarship, namely, Walter Eucken and 
Franz Böhm, derived from the dual commitments to the idea of an ―undistorted system of 
competition‖, on the one hand, and to the promise of social justice and security, on the other, 
a challenging task:  the dual commitment required institutionalising specific, albeit inter-
dependent, orders, namely, a legally-structured order of industrial relations and of social 
security (Arbeits- und Sozialverfassung) along with the legally guaranteed economic ordo, 
the ―economic constitution‖ (Wirtschaftsverfassung). In this sense, the economic order of the 
which the protagonists of the ―social market economy‖ envisaged was meant to be ―socially 
embedded‖. 
The ―really existing social market economy‖, however, was never as coherently realised as 
their conceptual Vordenker would have liked to see it. Even its economic core institution – its 
Wirtschaftsverfassung – was, by no means, a theoretically-uncontested and legally-
consolidated project. The strongest practical challenge to the Freiburg style of 
Ordnungspolitik was the renaissance of Germany‘s corporatist traditions already in the early 
years of the Bonn Republic. The Federal Republic was characterised by permanent tensions 
between Theorie und Praxis: striking discrepancies between the officious rhetoric of 
Ordnungspolitik, on the one hand, and the ongoing bargaining between the political system 
and the political and economic actors, on the other – a German Lebenslüge, to be sure, 
albeit an economically-successful and socially-beneficial arrangement.
27
 The perception of 
this discrepancy will have influenced the (ordo)-liberal ―turn to Europe‖, which implied a 
retraction from their earlier more global political preference.
28
 The European level of 
governance promised to ensure stronger barriers against the renaissance of Germany‘s 
corporatist traditions and its political opportunism in economic affairs than the institutional 
pillars of Germany‘s Ordnungspolitik. 
                                                     
27
 Well documented by W. Abelshauser, Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 
1949–1966, (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1987). 
28
The scepticism and resistance of leading ordo-liberals has been re-constructed and explained in detail by M 
Wegmann, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische Integration: Interdependenz der nationalen, supranationalen 
und internationalen Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1932–1965), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 
especially p. 351 et seq., for the importance of the political and social constitution for the project of economic 
integration (pp. 359–366). 
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II.3.  Europe as Community: Joseph H.H. Weiler 
In his very first publication on European issues,
29
 Joseph Weiler presented a vision, which 
he substantiated and defended in his Ph.D thesis,
30
 then retold, refined and complemented 
in his seminal narrative on the ―Transformation of Europe‖:
31
 Europe has, in its foundational 
period, so Weiler argued, managed to establish an equilibrium between legal 
supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism. His portrayal of European integration 
was inspired by his teachers in international law, on the one hand, and by the work of Erik 
Stein, on the other, but it was path-breaking and unique in its doctrinal lucidity and its 
sensitivity for the European synthesis of ―the political‖ and the law. 
Weiler‘s oeuvre is a powerful critique of the type of national state which Weber‘s inaugural 
address describes.
32
 Nowhere, however, did he talk about something akin to ―social Europe‖. 
Even in the concluding passages on democracy in Europe and the legitimacy of the 
integration project of the ―Transformations of Europe‖, there is no mention of the possibility 
that democracy might pre-suppose social justice and that Europe‘s socially-defined 
legitimacy might erode through a destruction of welfare state traditions. And yet, even though 
Weiler‘s value-laden work is characterised by a profound distance to technocratic precepts 
and economic rationalisation of the European Community, his visions seem surprisingly 
compatible with the benign neglect of the ―social deficit‖ of the European order in European 
legal studies during the foundational period. To be sure, Weiler‘s re-construction of the 
Europe as a Janus-headed polity was not meant as a conceptualisation which would exclude 
Europe‘s engagement in social issues as a matter of (legal) principle. It is, nevertheless, true 
that, thanks to the Realpolitik-kernel of his analysis, ―social Europe‖ was an unlikely option, 
and one of very limited significance, anyway. It was highly unlikely simply because its advent 
was dependent on unanimous inter-governmental voting; it was, by the same token, of little 
concern as the later tensions between the integrationist objective and the legacy of 
European welfarism were still dormant. 
II.4.  Three Concluding Observations 
As an interim summary, we can put on record an ambivalent legacy of the foundational 
period. On its bright side, we note the turning away from the Weberian nation state; less 
fortunate, however, was the benign neglect of the welfarist commitments of West European 
democracies. Both aspects deserve some further comments. 
                                                     
29
 J.H.H. Weiler, ―The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism‖, (1981) 1 Yearbook of European 
Law, pp. 257–306. 
30
 Idem, Il sistema comunitario europeo: struttura giuridica e processo politico, (Bologna : Il Mulino, 1985). 
31
 Idem, ―The Transformation of Europe‖, (1990–91) 100 Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403–2485. 
32
 See the thorough analysis by D. Gaus, ―Legitimate Political Rule Without a State? An analysis of Joseph H.H. 
Weiler‘s justification of the legitimacy of the European Union qua non-statehood‖, RECON Online Working paper 
2008/12, avalaible at: www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html. 
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II.4.1  The Taming of Weber’s National State 
The designers of the EEC-Treaty were both realistic and wise enough to understand that the 
darker legacy of the European political and economic nationalism would not fade away with 
the end of the war. Their objectives, however, were institutionalised prudently. The three 
foundational theories which we have sketched out have understood these messages and 
integrated them into their conceptualisation of the European project: no discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, no resorting to the political power of the state as an instrument of 
parochial economic advantages, common economic freedoms in the pursuit of economic 
prosperity – this was the lesson Europe seemed to have learned. 
II.4.2  The Neglect of the Welfare State Legacy of European 
Democracies 
We have defined the second communality of the early legal-integration theories negatively. It 
is more troubling, because the institutionalisation of welfare commitments could be, and was 
in fact, widely understood as a ―second pillar‖ of Europe‘s democratic conversion, a societal 
shield providing protection against a rebirth of the social anxieties which nationalist 
movements had instrumentalized. Why is it, we are both inclined and entitled to ask, that 
precisely the welfare state traditions of European democracies are not visible in the legal 
theories of European integration? Why does it need historians like Alan Milward
33
 and Tony 
Judt
34
 to remind Europe‘s legal academia that welfare traditions are what Europeans do 
have in common and what distinguishes their collective memories from that of American 
citizens? Why does it need political-scientists like Fritz Scharpf
35
 and Giandomenico 
Majone
36
 to remind European constitutionalists, albeit in very different perspectives, of the 
structural asymmetries in their constitutional visions? How comes that a scholar of the format 
and sensitivity of Joseph Weiler, in his seminal narrative on the ―Transformation of Europe‖,
37
 
fails to address the issue of ―social Europe‖, and, even in his comment on the Treaty of 
Maastricht, continues to present ―prosperity‖ as Europe‘s second value once without ever 
relating to social justice. What he offers, instead, is quite in line with his appeal to 
―Community‖, a somewhat metaphorical uploading of the notion of ―prosperity‖ with a 
―solidarity‖ dimension: a soft power, which he expects to control ―the demonic at the statal 
                                                     
33
 A. Milward, The Rescue of the European Nation-State, (London: Routledge 2nd. ed., 2000), pp. 21 et seq. 
34
 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 791 et seq.; idem, Ill 
Fares the Land, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), pp 127- 237 and passim. 
35
 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, ―The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity‖, (2002) 
40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 645-670, at 645-646, and, recently, ―The Asymmetry of European 
Integration – Or Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy‖, MPIfG Working Paper 09/12, available at 
www.mpifg.de. 
36
 Europe as he Would-be World Power (note 10 supra), p. 128 et seq. Majone is well aware, however, of the 
foundational moment; see his classic Regulating Europe, (Routledge: London-New York, 1996), p. 1: ―At the end of 
the period of reconstruction of the national economies shattered by the war income redistribution and discretionary 
macroeconomic management emerged as the top policy priorities of most Western European governments…‖. 
37
 Note 31supra, see, in particular, pp. 2476 et seq. 
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economic level‖.
38
 Is it by chance that, in European constitutionalism, it took primarily labour 
lawyers to remind us of the importance of ―the social‖ for democratic constitutionalism?
39
 
The omission of a ―social dimension‖ in the conceptualisation of the European project seems 
not so much a surprising omission, as a downright a failure. During the foundational period, 
welfare state policies and practices were, of course, controversial in many respects, but they 
were understood as national affairs. Only with hindsight have the implications and effects of 
this constellation become so clearly visible. Stefano Giubboni who has re-constructed both 
the mindset of the ―founding fathers‖ and the political bargaining over the Treaty of Rome 
carefully, concludes that we have to understand this outcome not as a mere failure but as a 
―historical compromise‖.
40
 The parties to this compromise are said to have trusted in the the 
wisdom of eminent economists who expected very positive effects from an opening of 
national Volkswirtschaften;
41
 they may also have trusted in he sustainability of a constellation 
which eminent political scientists were to characterise as an politically and socially 
―embedded liberalism‖.
42
 Such positive expectations seem well compatible with stringent 
transnational regulation where such interventionism were held to be indispensable, i.e., in 
agricultural policy. Legal scholarship, however, treated this socially extremely important and 
economically extremely costly domain as an ―exception‖ in the European edifice, which did 
not deserve, and did not, in fact, attract, closer academic scrutiny for a very long time to 
come.
43
 
II.4.3  Historical Indeterminacy and the Indispensability of Theory in 
Legal Argumentation 
The differences in the re-construction of the foundational constellation between the 
institutional generalists in European legal scholarship, on the one hand, and a later 
generation of labour law constitutionalists are quite illuminating: Brian Bercusson, writing 
under the impression of the Treaty of Maastricht, put all his hopes on the ―outstanding 
importance‖ of what was accomplished therein.
44
 Stefano Giubboni,
 45
 writing a decade later, 
                                                     
38
 See idem, ―Fin-de-Siècle Europe‖ in: R. Dehousse (ed), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union, (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 203-216, at 208 et seq. 
39
 See B. Bercusson, ―Social policy at the Crossrods: European labour law after Maastricht‖, in: R. Dehousse (ed), 
note 38 supra, pp 149-186; S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the EuropeanConstitution. A Labour 
Law Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); B. Bercusson, S. Deakin, P. Koistinen, Y. 
Kravaritou, U. Mückenberger & A. Supiot, ―A Manifesto for Social Europe‖, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 189-
205. 
40
 Ibid., p. 7. 
41
 See, most notably, the ―Ohlin Report‖: International Labour Organisation, ―Social Aspects of European Economic 
Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts‖, in (1956) 74 International Labour Review, pp. 99-123. 
42
 J.G. Ruggie, ―International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order‖, (1982) 36 International Organization, pp. 375-415; see J. Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and Its Critics: 
Justifying Global Governance in the American Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
43
 Until F. Snyder, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985); for a comprehensive 
recent analysis, see K. Zurek, ―European Food Regulation after Enlargement: Should Europe‘s Modes of Regulation 
Provide for more Flexibility‖, Ph.D Thesis EUI Florence 2010 (Chapter III). 
44
 Ibid., (note 39 supra), p. 183. 
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complemented the projection of positive signals into the European development in his 
comments on the later Treaty amendments and the (Draft) Constitutional Treaty;
46
 in 
addition, he started to seek legally-relevant backing for his views in the ―compromise‖ which 
he read into the Treaty of Rome: 
[T]he apparent flimsiness of the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome (and of the slightly 
less meagre ones of the Treaty of Paris, was in reality consistent with the intention, imbued 
with the embedded liberalism compromise, not only preserve but hopefully to expand and 
strengthen the member States‘ powers of economic intervention and social governance: i.e., 
their ability to keep the promise of protection underlying the new social contract signed by 
their own citizens at the end of the war.
47
 
Lasciate ogni speranza is, instead, the main message of Florian Rödl,
48
 writing after Viking 
and Laval, as far as the actual development of the Union is concerned. He renews, however, 
the defence of ―Social Europe‖ by the re-construction of the foundational constellation as a 
legally significant ―compromise‖. It seems, indeed, plausible to argue that the premises of the 
negotiators and their understanding of the EEC Treaty should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Article 153 (5) TFEU (ex-Article 137 (5)), which 
stipulates that ―the provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, 
the right to strike and the right to impose lock-out‖.
49
 The legal surplus of such suggestions 
seems minimal, however, and is a shaky ground for far-reaching conclusions as to the 
Union‘s social commitments. The Treaty of Rome has mentioned, in its Title III of Part Three, 
significant social fields, and Member States were, as Article 118 EEC Treaty confirms, 
expected to co-operate closely. It is also true that distributional and income polices were 
foreseen in an important part of the European Economy, namely, agriculture. Agustìn José 
Menéndez
50
 reads these provisions as strong elements of a federal structure foreshadowing 
the strengthening of the federalisation of Europe, whereas, in Giandomenico Majone‘s 
view,
51
 they confirm that the social-policy domain was ―considered to be outside the 
competence of the supranational institutions‖.
52
 Both of these readings are based on the 
same historical evidence. Both of them can claim to be valid – but they need to base their 
claims upon re-constructions which are informed by non-historical theoretical premises. 
                                                                                                                                                      
45
 Diritti Sociali e Mercato. La Dimensione Sociale dell’Integrazione Europea, (Bologna: Il Molino, 2003); (English 
version in note 39). 
46
 S. Giubboni, Social Rights (note 39 supra) at pp. 94-150. 
47
 Ibid., p. 16. 
48
 F. Rödl, ―Labour Constitution‖, in: A. v. Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 605-640; for a very similar argument, see L. Niglia, ―Form and Substance in 
European Constitutional law: The ‗Social‘ Character of Indirect Effect‖, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 439-
457. 
49
 On the doctrinal controversies on this provision, see Section V.3.2. infra. 
50
 ―United they diverge? From conflicts to constitutional theory? Critical remarks on Joerges‘ theory of conflicts of 
law‖, contribution to the workshop ―The changing role of law in the age of supra- and transnational governance‖ 
(note * supra; on file with author). 
51
 Majone, Europe as he Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 131 et seq. 
52
 Ibid., p. 132. 
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What we can more safely assume is simply that the negotiators operated on the assumption 
of same kind of ―embedded liberalism‖ and its sustainability, so that the protagonists of 
welfare policies could live with the compromise. If such expectations proved to be wrong, 
legal reasoning must not assume that conclusive normative arguments can be derived from 
―historical facts‖; it must, instead, engage in conceptual deliberations and controversies. It 
must become aware of the non-historical normative and analytical issues underlying 
historical re-constructions like those we have just mentioned. These issues are complex and 
sensitive: Does democratic governance, as a matter of principle, require that the objectives 
of social justice can be pursued by the political system? If so, is it at all conceivable that 
welfare policies can be successful institutionalised at European level, or is it, in view of the 
diversity of socio-economic conditions, political traditions and preference, more promising to 
preserve their variety? 
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III.  Hindsight and Foresight 
We have started this essay by listing some enormous challenges which Europe is facing 
today. The ―social deficit‖, which we have traced back to the institutional design of the Treaty 
of Rome, is just one of them, albeit one of particular importance in view of the collateral 
damage in terms of the social acceptance of the Union and the growing risks of populism 
and xenophobia. The social deficit furthermore illustrates particularly drastically the impasses 
of European politics, which result from the reliance of the integration project on the so-called 
Community Method. We will – in the first step of this section – illustrate these difficulties 
briefly, before we again take up the discussion of the three legal conceptualisations of the 
integration project. The development of these conceptualisations mirror, so we will argue, the 
practical impasses of European politics. It is important not to misunderstand the exercise we 
are undertaking as some fundamental critique, not even as a further characterisation of 
Europe as a ―faltering project‖.
53
 Instead, its objective is to pave the way for a paradigm shift 
which would defend the Union‘s accomplishments and, at the same time, open new 
perspectives. 
III.1.  Fragile Pillars of “Social Europe” 
The story of Social Europe has much in common with Michael Ende‘s most famous fairy 
tale.
54
 Every move in the process of economic integration was accompanied by counter-
moves towards a social re-imbedding of the European polity. These counter-moves did not 
just occur through the conferral of new competences to the Community in treaty 
amendments and subsequent legislative arenas. The ECJ, in particular through its anti-
discrimination jurisprudence, operated as a progressive instigator, and the reference 
procedure was often enough prudently and successfully used by labour law networks.
55
 
However, most of the changes were piece-meal with no comprehensive long-term 
background agenda. 
Social aspirations were more explicitly articulated in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The contours of what was to constitute Europe‘s ―social dimension‖, however, 
remained vague. Key concepts from national welfare states appeared in official documents 
without an equivalent institutional background. This held true for Germany‘s ―soziale 
Marktwirtschaft‖,
56
 for France‘s ―services publiques‖,
57
 and T.H. Marshall‘s notion of ―social 
                                                     
53
 See J. Habermas, ―European Politics at an Impasse. A Plea for a Policy of Graduated Integration‖ in: idem, 
Europe: The Faltering Project, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 78-106. 
54
 Michael Ende, The Neverending Story,( New York: Penguin Books, 1983). 
55
 See S. Sciarra, (ed), Labour Law in the Courts. National Judges and the European Court of Justice, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001). 
56
 See references above in notes 25, 26, & 35. 
57
 See the comparative account in M. Krajewski, Grundstrukturen des Rechts öffentlicher Dienstleistungen, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), p. 55 et seq.; for the European level, see U. Neergard, ―Services of General 
(Economic) Interest: What Goals and Values Count?‖, in: U. Neergard et al. (note 23), pp. 191-225. 
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rights‖.
58
 The only transnational European innovation was the ―Open Method of Co-
ordination‖ which the Lisbon Council of 2000 brought to bear in new areas of social policy.
59
 
Even Fritz W. Scharpf initially suggested that this alternative to the traditional community 
method ―could hold considerable promise‖.
60
 Sophisticated theorists were persuaded by the 
prospect of a seemingly democratic ―learning through monitoring‖.
61
 This initial enthusiasm 
was to fade away with the rather modest accomplishments of the Treaty of Lisbon, on the 
one hand, ambivalent or inconclusive practical experiences,
62
 and, last, but not least, the 
recent dis-embedding moves in the labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ, on the other.
63
 
III.2.  The Foresight of Theory: Three Retractions 
The rejection of all the constitutional ambitions in the Treaty of Lisbon and the present 
impasses of the integration praxis are also observable in the legal integration theory. Tellingly 
enough, this holds true for all of the three conceptualisations that we have sketched out 
above. This observation seems all the more significant as these three models – technocratic 
rule, economic rationality, and the community vision – were not chosen at random. They 
represent quite comprehensively the evolutionary options among which the integration 
project can choose and kept oscillating. All of them have been continuously present since the 
foundational period. They have been developing, even mutating, within their particular 
perspectives, be it in their responses to changing contexts, be it through mutual observation 
and political learning. We can neither try to document the continuities and innovations within 
each tradition, nor discuss the affinities between them in any detail. It is sufficient, for our 
argument, to characterise crucial transformations within each of them – and to underline 
telling parallels in their diagnosis of the current impasses. 
III.2.1 Technocracy without Efficiency? Majone’s Critical Turn  
The importance of the technocratic tradition in the praxis of the integration project can hardly 
be over-estimated. Its weight was bound to increase with the involvement of the European 
Community in ever more regulatory policies which were to be organised at transnational 
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levels without the backing of a consolidated democratic order. How else than through an 
―objective‖ and expertise-based conceptualisation of its enormous tasks could the European 
Community hope to ensure the acceptance of its involvement in ever more problem-solving 
activities? The by far most interesting and influential work which renewed and refined the 
technocratic legacy is that of Giandomenico Majone.
64
 It is unique not only in its clarity and 
its coherence, but also in its reflections of the option for an alternative to the democratic 
constitutionalism the Member States of the European Union. Majone‘s famous 
conceptualisation of Europe as a ―regulatory State‖
 65
 which operates essentially through 
non-majoritarian institutions was conceived as ensuring the credibility of commitments to in 
principle uncontested policy objectives. Welfare policies pose additional problems. The 
Union‘s failure to institutionalize a comprehensive social policy results partly from the 
―reluctance of the member states to surrender control of a politically salient and popular area 
of public policy‖; equally important is the factual difficulty and political impossibility to replace 
the variety of European welfare state models and traditions by some integrated European 
scheme.
66
 Not only does Majone respect the primacy of constitutional democracies; he is 
equally, and with increasing urgency, underlining the fallacy of an ever more perfect and 
comprehensive subjection of the integration project to its ―operational code‖, the principle 
―that integration has priority over all competing values‖
 67
, and also the camouflage strategies 
which he calls ―integration by stealth‖.
68
 This is an alarming retraction from his earlier trust in 
the problem-solving potential of the European project. His warnings do, by no means, reflect 
a change of theoretical premises. Majone continues to underline that Europe is not 
legitimated to pursue the type of distributional politics which welfare states have 
institutionalised.
69
 He does not retract his plea for regulatory efficiency. His critical turn is, 
instead, motivated by the inefficiencies which he observes in the Union‘s operations. His 
quest for more modesty in Europe‘s ambitions (―Geht’s nicht eine Nummer kleiner?‖)
70
 
summarises these observations. His adaption of the ―unity in diversity‖ formula
71
 is an 
implication of these insights to which we will return in the following Section IV. 
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III.2.2  What is left of the Economic Constitution? Ordoliberal Concerns 
An institutionalisation of economic rationality is most widely perceived to day, either 
affirmatively or critically, as Europe‘s main agenda.
72
 This perception gained prominence 
since the legendary White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market.
73
 At that stage of 
the integration process, the ordo-liberal tradition had experienced a deep transformation. 
That mutation had started at national level with the move of Friedrich von Hayek from 
Chicago to Freiburg and his promotion of version of neo-liberalism situated between the 
Freiburg School‘s orthodoxy, on the one hand, and the Chicago School‘s normative 
compalceny, on the other. Von Hayek‘s notion of ―competition as a discovery process‖ 
captures the essence of his messages best. They have led the second generation of ordo-
liberal scholars to re-define the objectives and the methods of national and European 
competition law. Attention shifted from the control of economic power to the protection of 
entrepreneurial freedom and the critique of anti-competitive regulation. What happened in 
the 1970s had been not anticipated, but was analysed with an amazing precision a good 
number of years ago by Michel Foucault in the course of the lectures he delivered at the 
Collège de France.
74
 There, Foucault characterised the ordo-liberal vision of the strong state 
which is committed to the protection of the competitive ordering of the market as a new type 
of governmentalité, namely, the acceptance of market governance by the political system 
and the whole of society.
75
 There are remarkable affinities between the second generation of 
Ordoliberals and the Chicago School when it comes to practical issues of competition law 
and policy, but they have never led to a real merger of the two schools. The heirs of Eucken 
and von Hayek did not subscribe to the Chicago understanding of economic output efficiency 
and ―consumer welfare‖ but continued to define and defend the ―system of undistorted 
competition‖ as the core of Europe‘s ―economic constitution‖.
 76
 They witnessed, however, a 
steady decline of the impact of their visions, which became clearly visible in the substantial 
broadening of European economic policies in the Treaty of Maastricht,
77
 the so-called 
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―modernisation‖ of European competition law
78
 and the move towards a ―more economic 
approach‖.
79
 The weakening of their ideational power was symbolically confirmed when 
French Prime Minister Sarkozy saw to it that the Union‘s commitment to ―a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted‖ was not included in Article 3 TFEU (ex Article 2 TEU) but 
moved back into Protocol 27 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
80
 
III.2.3  Unity without Community? J.H.H. Weiler’s Constitutional 
Complacency 
Joseph Weiler‘s early work can in hindsight be identified as truly path breaking in that it 
synthesised, in a novel way, Europe‘s constitutive historical move towards a common 
peaceful future, the construction of a supranational legal alternative to the role of 
international law in the system, while remaining aware of the political embeddedness and 
dependency of these accomplishments. The great normative perspectives and the sensitive 
realism in his design of an equilibrium between ―legal supranationalism‖ and ―political 
intergovernmentalism‖, however, became gradually ever more apparent as Weiler sought to 
develop his construct and vision further in the light of European experiences, 
accomplishments and failures. In his seminal article on the ―Transformation of Europe‖, he 
delivered an insightful diagnosis of the problematical implications of majority-voting in terms 
of Europe‘s legitimacy.
81
 He was among the first to realise the normative and political 
ambivalences of the completion of the Internal Market by the Delors Commission: 
To regard the Community as a technological instrument is, in the first place, to under-
estimate the profound political choice and cultural impact which the single market involves – 
a politics of efficiency, a culture of market.
82
 
We can summarise the forgoing observations in a second interim conclusion: the impasses 
of the integration praxis are mirrored and foreshadowed by the exhaustion of the main 
theoretical perspectives which have accompanied and oriented legal reflections, theoretical 
conceptualisations and the prescriptive modelling of Europe‘s finalité. Where practice and 
theory concur so significantly in their retractive moves, it seems about time to consider an 
alternative paradigm. 
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IV.  Europe’s Legitimacy Problem Revisited: The Conflicts 
Law Alternative 
Europe‘s ―operational code‖ is to prioritise integration ―over all other conceivable values 
including democracy‖.
83
 ―Unity in diversity‖, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, has 
become Majone‘s new leitmotiv.
84
 The legal form of this motto is the re-conceptualisation of 
European law as a new type of supranational conflicts law. That approach, however, seeks 
to open much broader perspectives than Majone envisages in his plea for a political 
modesty. Rather than repeating this argument once more,
85
 commentary is here restricted to 
a depiction of its five core messages.
86
 
IV.1.  Conflicts Law as Democratic Commandment 
The entire construction is built upon a sociological observation with normative implications. 
Under the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation, contemporary societies experience 
an ever stronger schism between decision-makers and those who are impacted upon by 
decision-making. This schism is explained by Niklas Luhmann within his sociological risk 
theory; according to Luhmann, the problem arises because decision-making on risks is 
always characterised by the fact that the potential damage is not simply borne by individual 
decision-makers, and nor is it only suffered by the persons profiting from the decision.
87
 
Luhmann‘s sociological observation is normatively disquieting in democratic orders. Suffice it 
here to point to Jürgen Habermas‘ first essay on European integration,
88
 which he published 
prior to the completion of his discourse theory of law and democracy,
89
 and later elaborated 
in greater detail:
90
 increasingly, constitutional states are unable to guarantee the inclusion of 
all of those persons who are impacted upon by their policies and politics within their internal 
decision-making processes. The democratic notion of self-legislation, however, which 
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postulates that the addressees of a law should be able to understand themselves as its 
authors, demands ―the inclusion of the other‖. 
IV.2.  The Supranationality of European Conflicts Law 
This plea for a new understanding of EU law, must not, the connotations of its terminological 
origin notwithstanding, serve as a retraction from supranationalism as such. Quite to the 
contrary, it furnishes a justification for the validity of the supranational jurisdiction – albeit one 
which is, just like the three models of legal integration theory discussed above,
91
 at the same 
time depicting the limits of supranational rule. To rephrase its sociological and normative 
basis slightly: as a consequence of their manifold degree of inter-dependence, the Member 
States of the European Community/Union are no longer in a position to guarantee the 
democratic legitimacy of their policies. A European law that concerns itself with the 
amelioration of such external effects, i.e., which seeks to compensate for the failings of the 
national democracies, may induce its legitimacy from this compensatory function. With this, 
European law can, at last, free itself from the critique that has accompanied it since its birth; 
a critique that states that it is not legitimate. It can thus operate to strengthen democracy 
within a contractual understanding of statehood, without needing to establish itself as a 
democratic state.
92
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IV.3.  Convergence, Re-construction, Critique 
Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of European law is only plausible to the exact degree 
that it may be re-constructed within this perspective, or that it may be furnished with a 
conflicts-law orientation. This, however, is already, often enough, the case: European law 
has given legal force to principles and rules which serve the purpose of supranational 
―recognition‖ – the non-discrimination principle, the supranational definition and the 
demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for actions that 
are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principle – which supplies a 
legal yardstick against which respect for supranationally-guaranteed freedoms may be 
measured – and the demand that all public exercise of power pays due regard to 
fundamental rights. All these principles and rules may be understood as a concretisation of a 
supranational conflicts law, which guarantees that the actions of the Member States are 
reconcilable with their position within the Community. This is not to say, however, that the 
solutions to the conflicts at which European law has actually arrived, are always convincing. 
Our re-construction of European law in the normative perspectives just outlined will reveal 
tensions between ―‖facticity‖ and ―validity‖, as well as failures and missed opportunities – the 
conflicts approach shares this type of experience with the three approaches which it seeks to 
replace. 
IV.4.  Internal Differentiation of Conflicts Law within Europe’s Multi-
level System: the Idea of a Three–dimensional Conflicts Law 
The metaphor of the multi-level system asserts that European ―rule‖ cannot be organised 
hierarchically. This argument is reflected, not only within the apportionment of competences 
within the EU, but also by the fact that vast discrepancies exist in the operational resources 
available at each ruling level. Accordingly, we are able to distinguish between three forms of 
legal collision – vertical, ―diagonal‖ and horizontal. Diagonal collisions are an important and 
unique feature of multi-level systems. They are a constant feature of life within the EU, since 
the competences required for problem-solving are, at times, to be found at the level of the 
EU itself, and, at other times, at the level of the Member States. This division of competences 
gives rise to two forms of potential conflict – on the one hand, between divergent EU and 
national political orientations, and, on the other, between divergent interest constellations in 
the Member States – so that very particular mediation arrangements must be identified. This 
need for mediation is true for all multi-level systems, but is particularly pressing in the case of 
the EU, where the existence of diagonal conflict has had, as its corollary, the evolution of a 
particularly intense degree of administrative co-operation, the institutionalisation of advice-
giving instances, and the systematic construction of non-governmental co-operative 
relationships. This infrastructure may be understood as furnishing the integral components of 
a conflicts law, a law that may no longer restrict itself to the individual adjudication of 
situational cases of conflict, and which must, instead, constantly busy itself with the finding of 
general solutions to universal problems. At the same time, such conflicts law must be 
methodologically and organisationally open to evolution, which has seen the development of 
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post-interventionist regulatory practices and legal forms within national law. Accordingly, we 
may identify three types of European conflicts law, which operate in three dimensions:
93
 
conflicts law of the ―first order‖ is flanked, on the one hand, by a conflicts law, which, most 
specifically in the realm of European comitology, has concerned itself with the elaboration of 
material (substantive) regulatory options, and, on the other hand, by a conflicts law, which 
governs the supervision of para-legal law and self-regulatory organisation. 
IV.5.  Conflicts Law as Proceduralising Constitutionalism 
It follows from the preceding sections that it would be factually and normatively mistaken to 
regard European law as a system of law dedicated to the incremental construction of a 
comprehensive legal edifice. Europe must, at last, take the motto of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty
94
 to heart, and learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accompany it far into the 
future, so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the process of European 
integration. It must further concede that this ―process‖ should be overseen by a conflicts law, 
which, by virtue of its identification of the principles and rules that govern conflict, will 
generate the law of the European multi-level system. Europeanisation is not simply a 
process of change; it is also a learning process. Law cannot pre-determine the substance of 
such processes, but may yet secure its own normative character, by virtue of its self-
dedication to the processes of law-making(Recht-Fertigung), which mirror and defend the 
justice and fairness within law.
95
 This understanding is by no means simply some Teutonic 
idiosyncrasy.
96
 It is akin to, for example, Antje Wiener‘s notion of ―the invisible constitution‖
97
 
or Deirdre Curtin‘s concept of the ―living constitution‖.
98
 Should it be that these daring ideas 
are the realistic in the sense that they represent the onbly conceivable type of responses to 
the challenges to which the European project is exposed. In his comments on the conflicts 
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96
 See M. Everson & J. Eisner, The Making of the EU Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond Constitutive Power, 
(Milton Park: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), in particular, p. 41 et seq. 
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 A. Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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 D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
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law approach Andrea Greppi has identified these difficulties with radical clarity.
99
 The 
proceduralisation of law risks to forego all substance, in particular a commitment to social 
justice. Its openness and plea for deliberative problem solving risks to be seized by the logic 
of technocratic managerialism. To summarize these concerns and hopes in a citation: 
―Whether intentionally or unintentionally, legal theory and philosophy suggest that they 
contain a remedial potential which in fact they lack, and necessarily must lack, to the extent 
that they fail to incorporate the inchoate values of individuals and institutions in society, the 
phenomenon Ernst Cassirer called the ‗constitution that is written in the citizens‘ minds‘‖.
100
 
                                                     
99
  ―Procedure and substance in postnational constitutionalism: Montesquieu or Sieyes?‖, contribution to the 
workshop ―The changing role of law in the age of supra- and transnational governance‖ (note * supra; on file with 
author). 
100
  V. Grosswald Curran, ―Law‘s Past and Europe‘s Future‖, (2005) 6 German Law Journal, pp. 483-512, at 
486, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com. The reference is to E. Cassirer‘s posthumously published The 
Myth of the State, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 91. 
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V.  the Deepening of Europe’s Legitimacy Problem by the 
ECJ’s Labour Law Jurisprudence 
As indicated, the conflicts-law approach is not meant as an artificial juxtaposition to positive 
European law, but it does claim to take up the legacy of legal realism, and, hence, to 
articulate that laws ―real life‖. This, however, is by no means a purely affirmative exercise. 
Both of the case studies in the following sections will use the approach to raise objections or 
to articulate reserves against important decisions of the ECJ. 
V.1.  The Example of Cassis de Dijon 
The conflicts-law approach advocates mitigation between controversies over diverging 
policies and complex interest configuration. With this aspiration, the approach departs 
markedly from the traditional treatment of public law provisions in private international law, 
international public and administrative law. Europe has, as Jona Israël put it, the chance and 
vocation to transform the comitas (voluntary and diplomatic co-ordination) among its states 
and societies into a legally-binding commitment to co-operative problem-solving.
101
 This has 
been accomplished in countless cases – more or less convincingly. The ECJ‘s legendary 
Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979
102
 may serve to illustrate this point. The ECJ‘s response to 
the controversy between Germany and France over Germany‘s prescriptions on a minimum 
percentage of alcohol in liquor was as plausible as it was trifling: the confusion of German 
consumers could be avoided, and a reasonable degree of protection against erroneous 
decisions by German consumers could be achieved by simply disclosing the lower alcohol 
content of the competing French liqueur. 
Damian Chalmers and Agustìn José Menéndez have raised objections of different weight. As 
Chalmers rightly underlines, the ―centre of gravity‖ of the case was in Germany and 
concerned conflicts of interest between a German distributor (REWE) and German liquor 
producers.
103
 This is so, but it does not affect the involvement of the ECJ in a conflict 
constellation which is within the European multi-level system. Chalmers‘ critique touches 
upon the upgrading of economic freedoms to constitutional rights which entitle those affected 
to a supervision of national legislation by the ECJ. This move of the ECJ was anything but 
trivial, because the Court has assumed en passant constitutionalising functions. This kind of 
power is inherent in any supranational supervision of national public law. Its constitutional 
sensitivity becomes apparent when we re-construct the issue in the framework of the 
discourse theory of law. Economic freedoms belong to the sphere of private autonomy and 
deserve recognition as constitutional rights. However, within consolidated constitutional 
democracies, the recognition of the constitutional status of the private sphere is 
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 J. Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), pp 123, 150-152, & 
323-334. 
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 Case 120/78, ECR [1979] 649. 
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complemented by the constitutional recognition and protection of political rights. Both 
spheres must be understood in the conceptualisation of Jürgen Habermas as ―co-original‖.
104
 
The issue, then, is of whether the ECJ has gone a step too far when complementing the 
recognition of the constitutional status of economic freedoms by its authoritative definition of 
the kind of concerns which are deemed to be compatible with the establishment of a 
common European market. It is this latter query to which Menéndez refers in his critique of 
the constitutional ambitions of the conflicts-law approach.
105
 This point is well taken,
106
 but it 
does in no way affect the reading of Cassis as a conflicts law case. The ECJ handed down a 
ruling on a complex conflict constellation. This ruling does provide a legal framework for this 
conflict. This ―is‖ conflicts law, albeit not necessarily good law.
107
 
V.2.  A Market Community? The ECJ’s Recent Labour Law 
Jurisprudence 
The much-debated recent labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ provides a line of cases in 
point. It is difficult for anybody aware of continental private and public international law or 
Anglo-Saxon conflict of laws not to realise the discrepancies between the latter disciplines 
and the decisions which the ECJ handed down under European law. This is not, in itself, 
deplorable. What deserves closer scrutiny, however, is the contents of the principles and 
rules which the ECJ has invoked and developed in its responses to the conflict constellations 
which were referred to it. 
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Thesis on ―Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice‖ 
(Brunel 2010), however, deserves exceptional treatment [see, also, his ―Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law 
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V.2.1  Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
These three cases are, by now, so well-known that it should suffice here to summarise their 
contents very briefly. 
The first case was decided on 11 December 2007.
108
 Finnish seafarers, employed on the 
ferry Rosella, become aware of the intention of their employer to flag out to Estonia. Since 
they ware afraid of loosing their jobs or being forced to accept lower wages, they tried to 
impress their employer by threatening to strike. This was legal under Finnish law. But, so 
their Finnish employer argued, such action was incompatible with its right Viking‘s right of 
free establishment as then enshrined in Article 43 EC. 
The response of the ECJ is conciliatory in its tone, but is, in fact, quite rigid. The ECJ starts 
out with underlining that the ―right to take collective action, including the right to strike … [is] 
a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community 
law‖.
109
 Then, however, the Court fundamentally re-configures the traditional balance 
between economic freedoms at European level and social rights at national level, explaining 
that the Member States, although ―still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing 
the existence and exercise of the rights in question…must nevertheless comply with 
Community law […]. Consequently, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to 
strike or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude collective action such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings from the application of Article 43 EC‖. 
The second case was decided only one week later.
110
 Laval, a company incorporated under 
Latvian law, had won the tender for a school building on the outskirts of Stockholm. In 
obtaining the tender, it had profited from the differences in the wage levels of Latvia and 
Sweden. In May 2004, when work was to start, and after Laval had posted several dozens of 
its workers, the Swedish trade unions resorted to hostile actions against Laval with such 
determination and intensity that Laval gave up. 
The Unions had acted legally according to Swedish law, but the Court referred to Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
111
 
This Directive requires, with respect to a number of essential working conditions, that foreign 
workers are not to be disadvantaged. According to Article 3, workers are to be guaranteed 
the minimum rates of pay. According to the general principle of the same Article, the rates of 
pay must be laid down either ―by law, regulation or administrative provision‖ or ―by collective 
                                                     
108
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agreements which have been declared universally applicable within the meaning of 
paragraph 8‖. Sweden, however, had refrained from changing its pertinent laws but relied on 
the exceptions listed in Article 3 Paragraph 8 (providing therein the absence of a system for 
declaring collective agreements or arbitration awards universally applicable. It left the 
determination of wage levels to collective agreements concluded among the undertakings 
themselves. The Court argued that, in this respect, Sweden was in breach of (secondary) 
Community law.
112
 
In the third judgment, which was handed down on April 2008, the ECJ further entrenched its 
position.
113
 Rüffert concerned the legality of a tender proffered by one of the German Länder, 
Lower Saxony, which contained a clause indicating that the public authorities were bound to 
respect existing collective-bargaining agreements, so that tendering firms would also be 
required to abide by the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. The ECJ held that Lower 
Saxony‘s legislation was irreconcilable with Article 49 EC since it prevented foreign service-
providers from benefiting from lower wage costs within their country of origin. 
The vital point within the judgment is its evaluation of the protective purpose of the clause 
committing the public authorities to respect collective agreements: in this respect, the Court 
held that ―contrary to the contentions of Land Niedersachsen and a number of the 
Governments, such a measure cannot be considered to be justified by the objective of 
ensuring the protection of workers‖. 
This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision of Germany‘s 
Constitutional Court, which had explained only in 2006:
 114
 
The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure the financial stability of 
the social security system, are particularly important goals, for the realisation of which the 
legislator must be given a relatively large degree of decisional discretion, and especially so 
under current, politically very difficult, labour market conditions.
 115
 
V.2.2  Dissenting Opinions in Luxembourg and their Disregard 
In all of the three cases, the Court‘s Advocate Generals – Poiares Maduro in Viking, 
Mengozzi in Laval, Bot in Rüffert – had submitted Opinions which differed, more or less 
significantly, from the Court‘s later judgments. In two more recent cases, the signals of 
dissent were becoming stronger and more articulate. 
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The first case concerns the applicability of Directive 2004/18 on a German pension scheme 
for public employees, and has considerable affinities with Rüffert.
116
 The German scheme 
foresaw the involvement of Trade Unions in the transformation of parts of their remuneration 
into pensions (Entgeltumwandlung). The European Commission found the involvement of 
the trade unions in the selection of insurers to be compatible with the Directive. 
The opinion which AG Verica Trstenjak delivered on 14 April 2010 does not directly question 
the Court‘s labour law jurisprudence.
117
 She explicitly refrains from supporting Germany‘s 
quest for an ―Albany exclusion‖,
118
 and confirms the applicability of the economic freedoms. 
She then adds, however, that the social right to collective bargaining and the freedoms are of 
equal weight and invokes the principle of proportionality as a guide for its resolution.
119
 The 
conflict is to be resolved at the level of primary law and that resolution has then to guide the 
interpretation of secondary legislation. This leads her to question the validity of the 
Commission‘s reading of the said Directive and to suggest that the complaint be 
dismissed.
120
 
The second case concerns the compatibility of Belgian requirements relating to the posting 
of workers in Belgium with the Posted Workers Directive.
121
 It is, in this respect, closer to 
Laval. GA Cruz Villalón, in his opinion of 5 May 2010, characterises this directive as a 
response to the conflicts between social values and economic freedoms which the internal 
market is bound to generate,
122
 and then complements the argument of his Slovenian 
colleague by a reference to Articles 9 and 3 TFEU, suggesting that, under Treaty of Lisbon, 
social protection is no longer to be understood as an exception from the economic freedoms, 
but as commitment of general validity. Like his colleague, he then invokes the proportionality 
principle to resolve these tensions.
123
 
The two Opinions move the conflict between economic freedoms and social rights to the 
European level and thereby strengthen Europe‘s judicial supranationalism. The premises 
and implications of this projection are difficult to understand. Both cases concern policy fields 
in which national law has not been replaced, but is only partially affected by European 
prerogatives. The prospects for a clarification of such queries, however, do not seem bright. 
In its judgement of 15 July 2010 the ECJ (Grand Chamber) rather flatly rephrases what has 
been stated in Viking and Laval: 
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While it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Germany the constitutional 
protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the German Basic Law upon the right to 
form associations to safeguard and promote working and economic conditions, the fact 
remains that, as provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be exercised in 
accordance with European Union law. 
Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore be reconciled with 
the requirements stemming from the freedoms protected by the FEU Treaty, which in the 
present instance Directives 92/50 and 2004/18 are intended to implement, and be in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.
124
 
V.3.  The Conflicts Law Alternative 
What is wrong about all this? There is no space here to comment on the European wide 
discussion of this jurisprudence. The following remarks will be restricted to some aspects 
which illuminate the specifics of the conflicts law approach. 
V.3.1  Sweden’s Social Democratic Sonderweg 
Patricia Mindus
125
 has, after her review of social and legal integration theories, turned to a 
dimension of the Laval case which she is extremely well-equipped to take up in such 
sophistication: The Laval litigation does indeed illustrate aspects of ―the Swedish 
Sonderweg‖ such as the legal status and social function of kollektivavtalssystemet which the 
Swedish legislature did not want to (dare to?) touch when implementing the Posted Workers 
Directive. She argues very convincingly that the ―Swedish model‖ is, by now, politically 
contested, and not only under pressure exerted by some ―kleptomaniac competence 
extension‖ of the ECJ. In a conflicts law language, Sweden has to become aware of the 
tensions between its Sonderweg and its European commitments. The Union and its highest 
Court must defend these commitments which are, at the same time, Community entitlements 
– and also be aware of the instrumentalization of European law and court proceedings in 
internal Swedish power battles
126
 – the Laval case was, after all, initiated and financed in 
Sweden.
127
 This is an instructive explanation of the background and the implication of Laval. 
It is also, at the same time, an instructive illustration of the conflict patterns which the 
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Europeanisation process generates. This observation confirms the assertion that European 
law ―is‖ conflicts law. But is Laval ―good conflicts law‖? The constellation is structurally the 
same as in Cassis de Dijon,
128
 but so much more dramatic. The message of the conflicts-law 
approach is seemingly abstract: the law should civilise the contest over divergent policies 
and interests without assuming the mandate to streamline Europe‘s diversity. 
V.3.2  Conflicts Law’s Prudence 
―Judicial restraint‖ v. ―judicial activism‖ is a misleading dichotomy here, and does not at all 
exhaust the potential of the traditions on which the conflicts-law approach builds. 
Antoine Lyon-Caen, the doyen of French labour law, has, without resorting to the conflict of 
law or private international law terminology recalled one core message: 
Dans les sociétés d‘Europe de l‘Ouest, le droit du travail s‘est constitué par émancipation du 
droit du marché, dénommé moyennant les variations terminologiques qu‘il importe de ne pas 
oublier: liberté du commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… Ce n‘est pas que des règles sur 
le travail n‘existaient pas avant cette émancipation, mais elles relevaient d‘avantage d‘une 
police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d‘une police du ou des marchés.
129
 
There is a categorical difference between economic law and labour law, Lyon-Caen argues. 
The most basic notion which conflicts law has at its disposal is ―characterisation‖
130
 and, 
Ernst Rabel‘s universalist visions notwithstanding, characterisation has, according to the 
prevailing view, to take the views of the forum seriously. The categorical difference is not 
written in stone and not pre-given as some transpositive ordo, but deeply rooted, albeit in a 
variety of forms, in the history of industrial and democratised societies. 
The European law parallel is the principle of enumerated competences. Awareness of this 
parallel is no longer widespread among European law scholars. This is unfortunate because 
the sensitivity of the elder discipline for the specifics of legal fields although provides some 
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guidance in the interpretation of such opaque provisions as Article 137 (5) EC (now 153 (5) 
TFEU).
131
 
The prudence suggested by conflicts law coincides with what we have noted in our 
references to the discourse theory of law and democracy.
132
 What the ECJ did in the 
perspective of this theory was to disregard the autonomy and co-originality of private and 
political autonomy, and to assign supremacy to economic freedoms over political citizenship. 
The conflicts law approach does, of course, pretend to have delivered an elaborated re-
construction of this inter-dependence at European level. What its understanding of the 
constitutionalisation strongly suggests, however, is to respect the variety in Europe‘s social 
models and to promote their co-ordination in the light of practical experiences. It seems 
perfectly justified to further the efforts of the new Member States to exploit their competitive 
advantages. It is by no means plausible, however, that ―direct wage competition‖
133
 would 
signal and achieve solidarity with these countries, and further both the prosperity within, and 
distributional justice among, Europe‘s diverse regions. It may be that, through the opening of 
the Western Markets for cheap labour, we foreclose the chances for accession states to 
build up their own social model. Should we really assume that the Swedish employer 
organisations seek to give a hand to the development of Estonia by the kind of strategies 
they pursued with Laval and the financing of the lengthy litigation in that case? European law 
should know more about the social price to be paid for the bringing of cheap labour to Old 
Europe before engaging in the flattening of Europe‘s diversity.
134
 
―Restraint‖ v. ―activism‖ is not the proper frame for these issues. The type of prudence which 
the conflicts law approach requires is as at least as demanding, but not identical with, what 
we expect from the constitutional courts of consolidated nation states or federations in their 
supervision of legislation. To this issue, we will have to return. 
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VI.  Conflicts Law or Community Method? Responses to 
Upper Austria’s Concerns with Atomic Energy 
The protection of ―health and life of humans, animals and plants‖ was mentioned as a 
legitimate regulatory concern in Article 36 EEC Treaty and complemented by the recognition 
of environmental protection as a matter of ―general interest‖ in the aftermath of Cassis de 
Dijon. Environmental issues are, indeed, the best conceivable case for the theoretical and 
normative core of the conflicts-law approach. Nowhere is it more evident that national 
decision-making has external effects, and that those affected in another territory are 
regularly excluded from domestic decision-making processes. Nowhere does it seem more 
plausible to establish a transnational regime with the potential to correct such failures Last, 
but not least, environmental issues are, often enough, of such political sensitivity that it 
makes sense to insist on the kind of horizontally-inclusive constitutionalism which the 
conflicts law advocates. 
European law and pertinent theoretical conceptualisations were, for a long time, far from 
respecting such insights. The unanimity rule governed in environmental policies. Political 
scientists provided us with the distinction of product and process regulation which seemed to 
rationalise the autonomy of national preference-building. However, since Maastricht, 
environmental protection has become a commitment of constitutional dignity – and has 
retained this status ever since.
135
 
It should hence be easy to provide plausible evidence militating in favour of our claim that 
the conflicts-law approach is not something external to the integration project, but a 
dimension of it which can be re-constructed in Europe‘s political and legal development. 
However, the discussion here will be restricted to one recent example of particular 
sensitivity, namely, the litigation over the Temelín nuclear power plant, between its operator 
ČEZ, a power-supply undertaking in the Czech Republic, and the Austrian Land of 
Oberösterreich, owner of a piece of land located at a distance of just 60 km from Temelín. 
The Temelin saga had two main stages. 
VI.1.  Case C-343/04: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ 
The Temelín nuclear plant was authorised by Czecheslovakian authorities back in 1985, and 
was brought into operation upon a trial basis and has, since 2003, been working at full 
capacity. 
The Austrians complained about ionising radiation emanating from the plant. They framed 
their complaint in private law categories and the controversy was hence, at this first stage, 
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fought out as a genuine horizontal conflict under the pertinent rules of private international 
law and the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention of 1968. 
The Land Oberösterreich brought its action before the Landgericht Linz, seeking an order 
that ČEZ put an end to the actual or potential nuisance relating to the ionising radiation 
potentially emanating from the Temelín power plant, in so far as they exceeded those to be 
expected from a nuclear power station operated in accordance with current generally-
recognised technological standards. Upper Austria based this request upon the actio 
negatoria of § 364 (2) of the Austrian Civil Code.
136
 AG Poiares Maduro, in his opinion of 11 
January 2006, and the ECJ, in its judgment of 18 May 2006,
137
 therefore turned to the 
pertinent provisions of the Convention. They hence asked: Are rights in rem at issue here so 
that the Austrian courts can invoke Article 16 of the Convention and claim exclusive 
jurisdiction? Is this matter, instead, to be qualified as a tort in the sense of Article 5 III 
governed by the lex loci delicti? (―the place where the harmful event occurred‖). 
The answer given by the ECJ to the question so framed sounds plausible: 
―... it cannot be considered that an action such as that pending before the national court 
should in general be decided according to the rules of one State rather than the other and in 
conclusion: this is no case of exclusive Austrian in rem jurisdiction.‖
138
 
Plausible as it sounds, one remains puzzled: If Austrian standards must not govern, does it 
follow that the defendant can operate the plant according to the standards of the Czech 
Republic without regard for the Austrian concerns? That would constitute a democracy 
failure of the type described above.
139
 AG Poiares Maduro, in one of his scholarly opinions, 
was digging much deeper: the courts of both interested states should be able to claim 
exclusive jurisdiction for the analysis of the statutory restrictions on ownership over 
immovable property located in their respective territories.
140
 This, however, implies that the 
risk of conflicting judgments.
141
 ―In such cases the judgment to be delivered must pay special 
attention to the transnational character of the situation.‖
142
 This may sound a bit sibylline, but 
indicates, in fact, the need for a conflicts law response: 
―If the national legal system allows the protection of property either through a property rule or 
a liability rule, the transnational dimension of the case and the possible difficulty of making a 
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full cost-benefit analysis may be relevant to such a choice. Secondly, the same concern for 
the consideration of the transnational character of the situation may be relevant in seeking a 
balance of all relevant elements with respect to the assessment of the amount of damage or 
the assessment of the risk that such damage may occur.‖
143
 
The ECJ found a quite comfortable way out, explaining merely that Austria cannot claim 
exclusive jurisdiction. This was only a preliminary end of the saga‘s first chapter. 
VI.2.  Case C-115/08: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ a.s. 
The Czech Republic and Austria have apparently taken Maduro‘s advice seriously. Both 
states ―declared that they would fulfil the series of bilateral obligations, including safety 
measures, monitoring free movement rights and the development of energy partnerships, set 
out in a document known as ‗The Conclusions of the Melk Process and Follow-Up‘, which 
was concluded in November 2001‖.
144
 
VI.2.1  The Shadow of Weber over Austria’s Oberster Gerichtshof 
But this agreement did not stop Upper Austria from pursuing its complaint further. In April 
2006, they obtained a judgment from the Oberster Gerichtshof, which was based upon the 
exception from § 364 (2) adopted in § 364a. This provision reads: 
―However, if the interference is caused, in excess of that level, by a mining installation or an 
officially authorised installation on the neighbouring land, the landowner is entitled only to 
bring court proceedings for compensation for the damage caused, even where the damage 
is caused by circumstances which were not taken into account in the official authorisation 
process.‖ 
The Austrian Court‘s is as traditional as it is interesting in the reasons stated for the refusal 
to recognise the authorisation of the Czech plant. Such authorisations, the Court explained 
have to weigh conflicting considerations and interests. This weighing, however, occurred in a 
foreign jurisdiction, and there was hence ―no reason why Austrian law should restrict the 
property rights of Austrian landowners purely in the interests of protecting a foreign economy 
and public interests in another country‖.
145
 This can be read as a tribute to the political nature 
of decisions on high-risk activities and the need for a democratic basis of such decisions. A 
principled refusal of Austrian courts to recognise the legitimacy of foreign authorisation is a 
blatant breach of European commitments. Unsurprisingly, both the ECJ and its Advocate 
General concurred in the conclusion. They differed, however, significantly and illuminatingly, 
in the reasoning upon which they base this conclusion. They share the same quandary in 
their responses to the true conflict underlying the controversy between the two neighbours: 
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Austria, after a referendum held in 1978, committed in its constitution to the rejection of 
atomic energy and confirmed it position by an unanimous parliamentary vote in 1997. 
Austria‘s neighbours are not entitled to reverse this position. On the other hand, Austria must 
not impose its views in its neighbours. 
VI.2.2  Administrative Suprantionalism in the ECJ’s Grand Chambre  
When confronted with the differences between Austria and the Czech Republic, the ECJ 
started to search for a resolution at a higher legal level. That search, however, did not lead to 
conclusive results. True, the EAEC Treaty of 1957, in its Title II, contains ―provisions 
designed to encourage progress in the field of nuclear energy‖. Neither this Treaty nor any 
other provision of European law does grant the competence ―to authorise the construction or 
operation of nuclear installations‖.
146
 All that Articles 30-31 EAEC provide for are procedures 
for the coordination of national standards for the protection of dangers from ionising 
radiation.
147
 The gap between these Articles remains puzzling. The way out of this dilemma 
which the ECJ takes is troubling: The principle of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality precludes, so the ECJ explains, legislation of a Member State under which an 
undertaking in possession of the necessary official authorisations for operating a nuclear 
power plant situated in the territory of another Member State may be the subject of an action 
for an injunction. Then follows a concession: It is for the national court to give, in so far as 
possible, to the domestic legislation which it must apply an interpretation which complies with 
the requirements of Community law. In the last instance, however, the national court is 
bound to protect the rights which Community law confers on individuals‖.
148
 
VI.2.3 AG Poiares Maduro’s Flirt with Conflicts Law 
The Opinion which AG Maduro delivered to the Court on 22 April 2009 is indefinitely more 
elegant. Maduro does not seek an escape route to public law of spurious supranational 
validity. The way he frames the problématique is a variant of the ―argument from external 
effects‖: 
This case may be characterised as one which turns on the question of reciprocal 
externalities. On the one side, Austria and, in particular, the Land Oberösterreich believe 
they are victims of an externality imposed on them by ČEZ and the Czech authorities in 
installing a nuclear power plant next to the Austrian border without taking into account the 
risks imposed on those living on the other side of the border. On the other side, ČEZ and the 
Czech Republic argue that it is the interpretation of Austrian law made by the Austrian 
Supreme Court that imposes on them an externality by requiring them to close the Czech 
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nuclear power plant simply to protect the interests of Austrian citizens and without taking into 
account the situation in the Czech Republic.
149
 
Not only the diagnosis, but also the suggested therapy is very much in line with the conflicts-
law approach. Maduro defines the law‘s proper objective as 
making national authorities, insofar as is possible, attentive to the impact of their decisions 
on the interests of other Member States and their citizens since this goal can be said to be at 
the core of the project of European integration and to be embedded in its rules.
150
 
He arrives at his solution in two bold steps. The first is an upgrading of the economic 
freedoms which he had already prepared in his Ph.D., and later on famously developed 
further.
151
 Maduro transforms the ―argument from external effects‖ into a legal duty to respect 
the extra-territorial interests of economic actors: 
[T]he rules of free movement aim at eliminating any restriction imposed by a Member State 
on economic activity in or with another Member State. A cross-border element is required but 
that cross-border element does not need to involve an actual hindrance of free movement 
from or to the State imposing the measure. It is sufficient that the extraterritorial application 
of that State measure may affect economic activity in another Member State or between 
other Member States.
152
 
This move implies that it is up to Austria to justify the impact of its restrictive views on the 
Czech Republic. In this respect, he seems to proceed more subtly than the ECJ. The duty to 
take the impact of Austrian decisions on its neighbours into account is indeed an implication 
of the ―argument from external effects‖. It is also worth noting that the AG does not 
camouflage the lacunae of European law in the present constellation.
153
 That argument, 
however, works both ways. The Czech Republic must take the concerns of its neighbours 
seriously. This is precisely the type of ―true‖ conflict which should according to the conflicts of 
law‘s theory of the American conflicts scholar Brainerd Currie by a higher legislative authority 
(by Congress in the American federal system).
154
 AG Maduro does not refer to such 
theorising but he is perfectly aware of the problématique to which Brainerd Curie responded 
in such an uncomfortable way. He implicitly subscribes to the ―true conflict‖ analysis with his 
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notion of ―reciprocal externalities‖
155
 – and then seeks to forego Currie‘s non possumus in a 
search for a reconciliation of both concerns:  
In balancing the achievement of public policy goals, such as protection of human health and 
property rights, with the restriction of rights protected by Article 43 EC and other free 
movement provisions which a refusal to recognise a Czech authorisation will entail, the 
Austrian court must take account of the fact that Community law specifically authorises the 
development of nuclear installations and the development of nuclear industries in general. It 
must also give weight to the fact that the authorisation granted to the Temelín facility by the 
Czech authorities was granted in accordance with the standards established by the relevant 
Community law.
156
 
The first step in the argument sounds nothing but logical, the second, however, is not easily 
to reconcile with the AG‘s observation that ―the EAEC rules are only aimed at regulating the 
conditions under which a nuclear facility should be authorised to operate‖.
157
 It is by no 
means clear why such regulations should trump Austria‘s constitutionalised no to Atomic 
energy. The democracy gap which we have observed in the ECJ‘s labour law jurisprudence 
re-surfaces again and the answers remain unsatisfactory. The non-discrimination principle 
alone must not outrule Austria‘s principled objections against nuclear energy. The economic 
freedoms which the Treaty grants to Czech citizens must not trump the political rights of 
Austrian citizens. This constellation is even more intricate than the conflicts between national 
labour law and European freedoms. There, we have argued that European law would be well 
advised to respect national welfare traditions. This type of solution is unavailable in the 
present conflict. European law can neither legitimise nor prohibit nuclear energy. One may 
argue that de facto irrevocable decisions like that on atomic energy should never be taken. 
But such a normative argument must not be transformed into a legally-binding decision by 
judicial fiat. At the end of the day, GA Maduro, but equally the ECJ, gave the only possible 
answer to an irresolvable problématique. 
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VII.  The “Geology” of Contemporary Law and the Project of 
a Three-dimensional Conflict s Law 
―Unity in Diversity‖, unitas in pluralitate, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, transposes the 
European ambitions and perspectives of the conflicts-law approach. Neither the significance 
of this motto, nor its translation into the language and proceduralising methodology of the 
conflicts-law approach are confined to Europe‘s postnational constellation. The need to cope 
with conflicting policies and to ensure the legitimacy of their ―weight‖ and co-ordination is 
present at all levels of governance, in the international system as well as within constitutional 
democracies. At all levels, this problématique has provoked a turn to ―proceduralisation‖, and 
fostered the insight that legal decision-making cannot be deductive, but must be constructive 
and must derive its legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making 
processes. The identification of this problématique at all levels of governance and in the 
―diagonal conflicts constellations‖ between them, which multi-level constellations generate, is 
just one message of the conflicts-law approach, which these concluding remarks wish to 
underline. Equally important is a second message which requires a three-dimensional 
differentiation of the conflicts-law approach. The title of this section alludes to this second 
message. ―Geology‖ is a term borrowed from Joseph Weiler, who introduced it to explain 
transformations of international law of paradigmatic importance.
158
 ―International law as 
Regulation‖ is a notion which he contrasts with ―international law as Transaction‖ and 
―international law as Community‖. It represents ―a new mode of international law, specific in 
its normativity and legitimacy‖. This latter insight corresponds to the grand debates on the 
new functions and normative qualities of the law of post-laissez faire welfare states, which 
dominated the agenda of the pre- and post-1968 generations. 
VII.1.  Post-interventionist Law and the Turn to Regulation and 
Governance 
These two generations witnessed, or participated in, two big waves of theorising. The first 
wave was preoccupied with the social deficits and methodological flaws of ―legal formalism‖; 
the replacement of formalism by substantive rationality criteria was the slogan of the day.
159
 
―Law as regulation‖ was not the then prevailing terminology; substantive rationality was to be 
carried into law through ―interventionism‖. As all this did not really work out, a second wave 
of theorising was initiated: substantive rationality was replaced by post-interventionist 
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programming, in particular through reflexive law and the quest for a proceduralisation of the 
category of law.
160
 
These moves sought to come to grips with the law‘s assumption of, and involvement in, ever 
new tasks and problem-solving activities. The search for post-interventionist programming 
(―governance structures‖ is the now widely-used term) and legal methodologies sought – or 
should have sought – to reconcile the erosion of formerly ―conditional‖ legal programmes 
with the legacy of the rule of law and the idea of law-mediated legitimacy of democratic rule. 
Nobody has characterised this new challenge as pointedly as Rudolf Witethölter in one of his 
early essays: ―Purposive programming‖ is the living law and legal conditio sine qua non 
(Lebenselexier) of modern democracies, he wrote back in 1973
161
 and complemented this 
message in 1977 through the discovery of the affinities or structural analogies with conflict of 
laws.
162
 In the meantime, he had already proclaimed the need for a ―proceduralisation of the 
category of law‖.
163
 
Practice, sociological research and theoretical reflections did not come to a standstill. We 
have, for many years now, accustomed ourselves to ever more sophisticated regulatory 
programming and we have, more recently, witnessed a turn to ―governance‖, a notion 
encompassing a grand variety of widely-used co-operative arrangements between 
governmental and non-governmental actors. There is no space and no need to elaborate on 
all this here. The only observation to be underlined concerns the structural parallels in the 
national and the postnational constellations. The geology which Joseph Weiler has depicted 
in international law can be observed at all levels, even within constitutional law. Parallel 
structures generate similar challenges. Regulatory politics need to be institutionalised and 
governance arrangements established within the European Union and beyond its ―borders‖. 
The practical and challenges and normative problem that these developments pose, 
however, vary considerably. 
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VII.2.  The Need for a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law 
Throughout the preceding sections, we have dealt with primary and secondary European 
law, on the one hand, and the legal systems of the Member States, on the other. The 
sociological background analytics, the normative premises of the doctrinal fabric of the 
conflicts approach can, quite plausibly, claim to capture the distinctiveness of the EU multi-
level system and its vertical, horizontal and diagonal conflicts adequately. With regard to the 
latter, it should have become particularly apparent why the conflicts-law approach cannot be 
reduced to the choice of a particular legal order. However, European conflicts law is also 
distinct in the conceptualisation of ―vertical‖ and ―horizontal‖ conflicts. Its rules and principles 
are supranationally valid, and, in this respect, stronger than the legal regimes established by 
international law; equally unique is the degree to which European law has transformed the 
comitas among Member States into binding legal-commitments.
164
 This conflicts-law system, 
however, is by no means comprehensive. The structural reasons have just been addressed: 
the transformations which have occurred at national level in the turn to regulation and 
governance are also under way in the EU and in the international system. 
Regulatory politics in the European Union have led to the establishment of complex 
transnational non-legislative quasi-administrative regimes, which we have characterised as a 
second dimension of conflicts law. It responds to the irrefutable need to accompany the 
Europeanisation of the economy by transnational regulatory politics which must operate 
outside the administrative-law frameworks which nation states have at their disposal. These 
need have triggered the co-operation of national bureaucracies with networks of epistemic 
communities with the European Commission in the much criticised – but also much praised –  
comitology system, the establishment of ever more European agencies most of whom are 
without genuine decision-making powers. The conflicts-law approach seeks, here too, to 
defend the idea of the rule of law and law-mediated legitimacy. Its constitutional hopes and 
perspectives focus on the quality of transnational decisions-making and its anchoring in, and 
supervision by, democratically legitimated actors – hence, again, on a proceduralisation of 
law.
165
 
The third dimension of conflicts law reacts to the ―privatisation‖ of regulative tasks and the 
development of new ―governance arrangements‖, which can also be observed at national 
level, but which are, unsurprisingly, particularly important at transnational levels.
166
 Any 
sharp differentiation between primarily administratively-anchored regulative forms with which 
the conflicts law of the second dimension is concerned from the primarily private regimes is 
not possible, because of the participation of expert communities and societal actors in both 
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of them. What the law needs to be concerned about, is the regulative function which both 
types exercise, and what it has to consider is its potential to ensure their legitimacy. The 
conflicts law approach in its third dimension does therefore not qualify these regimes 
complacently and without further ado as transnational ―law‖. Instead, it seeks to develop and 
promote the impact of normative yardsticks for their recognition by democratic legal orders; it 
furthermore builds upon the law‘s shadow, particularly the interests of non-statal orders in 
external recognition and their ensuing readiness to subject themselves to a stringent 
procedural discipline.
167
 
VII.3.  The Mandate of the ECJ in Conflicts Law Perspectives 
Critical assessments of the ECJ, like they have been submitted above, are apparently 
difficult to digest even in the relatively progressive law quarters of European law scholarship 
and with the critics stigmatised as ―enemies‖.
168
 The circle of potential addresses is 
widening. It not only includes political organisation such as trade unions, but may also be 
directed against those who argue that the ECJ operated outside good legal manners in the 
Mangold case,
169
 and it without further ado included the German Constitutional Court after its 
pronouncements on the Treaty of Lisbon.
170
 The discovery of such enemies may, however, 
signal more of a crisis of the Court and the Dominicans among its academic allies, than 
some malicious anti-European scepticism among its critics. It should be recalled that the first 
seminal article on the constitutionalising activity of the ECJ has explained the Court‘s 
success by the fact that the ECJ operated ―tucked away in the fairytale Kingdom of 
Luxembourg‖.
171
 Eric Stein‘s most famous disciple has warned as early as 1994 that the 
―extended honeymoon‖ between the Court and its interlocutors may have come to an end.
172
 
We know, indeed, too much about the context and the conditions which have fostered the 
broad acceptance of the Court‘s jurisprudence to simply assume that the Courts 
performance and the Court‘s recognition by its interlocutors will remain stable.
173
 
Should the impact of the ECJ have resulted from the trust in its non-partisan and the non-
political nature of its adjudication and the beneficial effects of these beliefs, the conflicts law 
approach has to plead guilty to the accusation of not respecting this fiction. This unmasking 
of what cannot be concealed anyway, builds upon both so many conclusive analyses of the 
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ECJ in particular and the politicisation of the integration project as a whole.
174
 The state of 
the Union is too critical and the integration project too precious to benefit from this type of 
critical exchange. Europe and its Court would deserve a more serious effort. Lawyers and 
political scientists have produced very strong analyses of the Court‘s performance and 
impact.
175
 It is nevertheless stunnning to observe how cautious the maîtres penseurs of 
constitutional and legal theory operate when it comes to define the theoretical basis and 
legitimate functions of the ECJ.
176
 What these analyses do not include is a political theory of 
the kind and of the quality of the theorizing on constitutional courts and their legitimacy. The 
conflicts-law approach cannot claim to fill this gap conclusively. The distinction, however, 
between the supervision of political powers within constitutional democracies, on the one 
hand, and the compensation of democracy failures of nation states by European law, on the 
other, should at least provide some new orientation for further research. 
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